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THE REASONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY: EVIDENCE FROM A
SURVEY OF FIRMS*
CARL

M.

CAMPBELL

III AND KUNAL S.

KAMLANI

A survey of 184 firms was conducted to mvestIgate the reasons for wage ngidity The strongest support was found for explanations based on adverse selection
in quits and on the effect of wages on effort. In addition, survey respondents mdicated that reducmg turnover IS an Important explanation of wage ngIdIty for
wrute-collar workers, and that implicIt contracts are an important explanation for
other workers. Respondents also belIeved that effort responds more strongly to
wage decreases than to wage mcreases and that wage decreases have a greater
Impact on the effort of low-skIlled workers than of hIgh-skIlled workers.

I. INTRODUCTION

One challenge facing economists is to explain why firms do
not appear to adjust wages very much in response to labor market conditions, particularly why there seem to be so few wage
cuts when unemployment is high. Over the past twenty years,
several theories have been developed to explain why firms may
find it optimal to refrain from cutting wages in recessions, even
though wage reductions would decrease labor costs. Five of the
most prominent of these theories are contract theory, I implicit
contract theory, efficiency wage theory, fair wage theory, and
insider-outsider theory, each of which is briefly described in Table
I. Using this theoretical work as a guide, we attempted to determine the most important reasons for wage rigidity by surveying
individuals responsible for setting wages.
Surveys of firms' wage-setting policies have also been conducted by Kaufman [1984], Blinder and Choi [1990], Bewley
[1994, 1995],2 and Agell and Lundborg [1995]. The composition of
firms in their samples and their main results are summarized in

* We would lIke to thank Patncia Anderson, Truman Bewley, Kenneth EIzmga, Jack Knetsch, Andrew Oswald, Jonathan Skinner, Andrew WeISS, seminar
partIcIpants at the NBER BehaVIoral MacroeconomIcs Workshop, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlIer verSIOns of thIS paper. Fmancml
support from the John Hartman Summer Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.
1 As reported m Compensatwn and Workmg Condttwns [1994], 12 3 percent
of workers were represented by labor unions, and 11.2 percent ofpnvate workers
were actually members of labor unions. WhIle contract theory is probably an Important explanation of wage ngIdIty for these workers, wntten contracts are probably not a source of wage ngidIty for the vast maJonty of workers, so thIS study
does not deal extensively wIth contract theory.
2 Bewley is m the process of writmg a book descnbing rus findings. The
references m trus study are to presentatIOns he made concernmg prelimmary results of hIS survey
© 1997 by the PreSIdent and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts InstItute
of Technology
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TABLE I
THEORIES OF WAGE RIGIDITY

Theory
Contract theory
Implicit contract theory
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c Adverse selectlon model
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d Turnover model
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Fair wage-effort hypothesIs
InsIder-outsIder theory

Source of wage rIgIdIty
Long-term contracts between firms and workers set wages m advance and are negotlated on a
staggered baSIS [FIscher 1977, Taylor 19791Workers are rIsk averse, prefernng a real wage that IS stable over the business cycle to one
that rIses m expanSIOns and falls m receSSIOns. A firm offerIng ItS workers a steady wage
could therefore pay an average wage below what it would otherwIse have to pay because it
would be gIving workers a compensating differential in return for the lower average wage.
ThIS rIsk averSIOn gives firms and workers an mcentlve to reach an Implicit understanding
that the wage WIll be kept stable over the busmess cycle [Bally 1974; Gordon 1974; AzarIadls
1975; Stlghtz 1986].
Workers' productIvity depends positively on the wage [Solow 1979; Yellen 1984; Stightz 1986].
The cost of losmg one's Job depends posItlvely on the wage, so that a higher wage will mduce
fewer workers to shIrk and rIsk dismissal [ShapIro and Stlghtz 1984]
Workers VIew a hIgher wage as a gIft from the firm, IndUCIng them to work harder as a gIft to
the firm [Akerlof 1982, 1984].
A hIgher wage raises the average quality of a firm's applicant pool In addItIOn, adverse
selectIOn may also apply to qUIts, SInce a firm's most productlve workers are the most hkely to
qUIt If It cuts wages [WeIss 1980, 1990]
Workers' quit rates depend negatlvely on the firm's wage. Thus, a firm paYing hlgher wages
Wlll have lower costs of hIrIng and training new workers. In additlon, ItS workers on average
Will have acqUIred more firm-specIfic human capital, making them more productlve than
SImIlar IndIvIduals WIth no experIence at the firm [Stlghtz 1974; Schhcht 1978, Salop 1979,
HashImoto and Yu 1980].
If workers' wages are below theIr perceIved faIr wage, then their effort depends on the ratio of
theIr wage to theIr perCeIved faIr wage [Akerlof and Yellen 1990].
FIrms do not dIsmISS theIr current workers (1 e , mSIders) and hIre the unemployed (1 e ,
outsIders) at a lower wage because of the cost of hlrmg and trammg new workers and because
of the abIlity of insiders to harass or not cooperate with new entrants hIred to replace
dismissed inSIders. The costs of replacmg mSIders With outsIders gives insiders a great deal of
power in setting their own wage [Lindbeck and Snower 1988]
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Table II. Note that the samples used by these researchers were
concentrated in certain geographical areas, or in the case of Agell
and Lundborg, included only manufacturing firms. In addition,
Blinder and Choi and Agell and Lundborg concentrated on large
firms, while Kaufman concentrated on small firms. To extend this
work, we tried to survey a more representative sample of firms
and to ask a more detailed set of questions. In addition, our survey asked separate questions about broad occupational groups,
and the questions were less open-ended than those in some previous surveys, making the responses easier to quantify.
The methodology of our survey is described in Section II. Section III discusses the responses to a part of the survey in which
participants were asked to evaluate the importance of various
statements, based on theories of wage rigidity, in explaining why
their firm does not normally cut wages as low as possible during
recessions (if their firm does not do this). In Section IV we present
the responses to more detailed questions concerning the explanations that were rated most highly in Section III. Section V provides a brief conclusion.
Respondents indicated that the greatest deterrents to wage
cuts are adverse selection as it applies to quits and the fear that
wage cuts would generate negative feelings among workers and
thereby lead to less effort. In addition, firms' desire to decrease
hiring and training costs and to retain workers with firm-specific
human capital was rated as an important factor in explaining the
rigidity of wages, particularly for white-collar workers. Respondents also considered implicit contract theory to be a reasonable
explanation of wage rigidity for blue-collar and less skilled workers. On the other hand, the responses to our survey were not supportive of the efficiency wage model based on shirking or of a
literal interpretation of insider-outsider models.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY

The 184 firms in this study were drawn from several sources.
Most of the survey respondents were compensation executives in
Business Week 1000 corporations. Since this sample consisted of
large firms, which may not be representative of the entire economy, we also included some smaller firms in our sample. The Appendix describes our survey design and sample population, and
Table III provides descriptive statistics about our sample population. These figures were obtained from questions about firms' pri-
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TABLE II
RESULTS OF PREVIOUS SURVEYS

Study
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Mam results

FIrms were asked If they could find qualIfied personnel
at less than current wages, and rf so, what prevents
the firm from cuttmg wages The most common
response to the latter questIOn was that wage
reductIons would upset workers and that theIr
response would be a reduction m work effort
Strong support was found for theones of wage ngrdlty
Blmder and ChOl [1990J
19 large firms m New Jersey and eastern
Pennsylvama were mterv18wed. These firms were involvmg faIrness and labor turnover
selected from Ward's Busmess Dlrectory of U. S
FIrms, which lIsts compames wIth annual sale" of
more than $11 mIllIon.
The most Important reason why firms generally do not
Bewley [1994, 1995J
258 firms, located mostly m ConnectIcut, were
mterviewed There was much vanatIOn between
cut pay dunng a receSSIOn IS that they fear a pay cut
mterVlews m the tOpICS dIscussed and m the
would adversely affect workers' morale and
questIOns asked of respondents, BO most of the
mohvatlOn In addItIon, respondents mdIcated that
study mvolves anecdotal eVIdence. The sample
morale IS related more to wage changes, partIcularly
was obtained by networkmg The imtial set of
wage decreases, than to wage levels
mterYlews was obtamed through friends,
relatIves, and calls to local firms Dunng these
mterVIeWS respondents were asked for the names
of addItIonal contacts, and thIS process was
contmued m subsequent mtervIews
Agell and Lundborg [1995J 179 SwedIsh manufacturmg firms were surveyed Workers' concerns about faIrness and relatIve wages
The medIan and mean firm SIze were,
play an Important role m explammg why firms do not
respectIvely, 574 and 1154 employees, meanmg
normally cut wages In recessIOnary penods
that theIr sample mostly consIsted oflarge frms
In addItIon, the overall umomzatIOn rate of firms
m theIr sample was 92 percent.

Kaufman [1984J

oo

Sample ComposItion
The sample consIsted of 26 BntIsh firms m Wales,
the West MIdlands, and the Greater London area,
concentratmg on small nonumomzed firms The
medIan firm SIze was seven employee", and only
SIX firms had more than 50 employees
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TABLE III
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Mean
11,927.1
Employment
14.7%
Percent uruoruzed
Percent whlte-collar
44.9%
19.7%
Percent blue-collar
Percent less skIlled
35.0%

Standard dey
23,65736
26.60
28.79
22.20
28.55

Medlan Mmimum Maximum
3800.0
0.0%
400%
130%
28.5%

2
0%
0%
0%
0%

168,000
99%
100%
80%
100%

Comparison Between the Industrial ComposItion of the Sample and the Industnal ComposItion of Employment in the United States Economy
% of firms
m sample

Mming
ConstructIOn
Manufacturing
Transportation, commurucatIOn,
and publIc utilItIes
Wholesale and retaIl trade
ServIces
FInance, insurance, and real
estate

11%

% of employment
in U S economy

2.2
320
15.8

07%
50
195
6.3

15.2
15.8
179

28.3
33.1
7.2

mary product or service (which were converted to the appropriate
SIC code), the number of workers employed at the firm (in all
establishments), the percentage of workers who are unionized,
and the percentage of workers classified as white-collar, bluecollar, and less skilled, as defined III the text.
The reasons for wage rigidity may differ across occupational
groups. Thus, workers were divided into three broad categorieshighly skilled white-collar, highly skilled blue-collar, and less
skilled-and many questions asked the respondent to provide answers for the two groups of workers who were most highly represented in the firm's workforce. Highly skilled white-collar workers were defined as white-collar workers with at least two years
of college or more than 160 hours of training, where training was
defined as any apprenticeships, vocational training, or formal
training inside or outside the firm. Highly skilled blue-collar
workers were defined as blue-collar workers who perform jobs requiring special skills or more than 160 hours of training. Less
skilled workers were defined as workers performing jobs requir-
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ing less than two years of college and no more than 160 hours of
training. In the dIScussion of the results, highly skilled whitecollar and highly skilled blue-collar workers are referred to as
white-collar and blue-collar workers, respectlvely.
In addition, the reasons for wage rigidity may differ across
firms. To examine these differences, we created six subsamples of
firms by dividing the sample between firms in goods-producing
industries and firms in servIce-producing industries,3 between
small to midsized firms (firms with less than 1000 employees)
and large firms, and between highly unionized firms (more than
30 percent unionIzed) and less unionized firms.4
When there is a distmction between real and nominal wage
rIgIdity,5 the questions dealt wIth nominal wages, because respondents probably have a better comprehension of nominal
wages than of real wages and because research for the United
States suggests that nominal wages are more downwardly l'lgld
than real wages. For example, McLaughlin [1994]; Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher [1995]; Card and Hyslop [1996]; and Kahn
[forthcoming] found that nominal wage changes are asymmetrically distributed, with a disproportionate number of workers experiencing exactly a zero percent yearly change in their nominal
wage. Furthermore, the last three of these studIes found that
fewer workers receive nominal wage cuts than would be expected
from the distribution of wages. In contrast, the studies that examined real wages 6 did not find the same degree of asymmetry in
the distribution of real wage changes or evidence of an unusual
number of workers receiving exactly a zero percent real wage
change. 7
3 The goods-producmg mdustnes are mmmg, constructIOn, and manufactUrIng, and the servlce-producIllg muustnes are transportatIOn and publIc utlhties, wholesale and retaIl trade, serVIces, and finance, msurance, and real estate
4 There were 118 firms (64.1 percent) m the subsample of large firms, 66
firms (35 9 percent) m the subsample of small to mldslzed firms, 38 firms (20 7
percent) III the subsample of hIghly umomzed firms, 146 firms (79 3 percent) m
the subsample ofless umomzed firms, 65 firms (35 3 percent) m the subsample of
firms producmg goods, and 119 firms (647 percent) m the subsample of firms
producmg servIces The average scores from these vanous subsamples are not
repOltcd because of space lImItatIOn, but a table presentmg thE'se results IS avaIlable from the authors upon request
5 Many questJOns dealt wIth Issues such as why firms may not cut wages as
low as pOSSIble III recessIOns or how relative wages vnthlll the firm affect effort
and morale For these questIOns, the dlstmctIOn between real and nommal wages
has lIttlE' meanmg
6 See McLaughllll [1994] and Card and Hyslop 11996]
7 An addltlOnal reason for focusmg on nommal rather than real wages 18
that research by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [19861 and Campbell [1995a1
suggests that workers respond dIfferently to a real wage decrease caused by an
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COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY

In part of the survey, respondents were given a series of
statements based on various theories of wage rigidity and were
asked to indicate the importance of each in explaining why their
firm normally does not cut wages during recessions to the 1.owest
level at which it can find the necessary number of qualified workers (if their firm normally does not cut wages as low as possible
in recessions).8 While these statements are not exhaustive of the
possible reasons for wage rigidity, they represent some of the
most important explanations that have been advanced in recent
years. Respondents were asked to rate each statement as not important, of minor importance, moderately important, or very important. These responses were converted into numerical scores
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing not important and 4 representing
very important. A similar coding scheme was used by Blinder
[1991] in his study of price rigidity, and he considered an average
over 2.5 as reasonably strong and an average over 3.0 as very
strong. Respondents were also asked which reason was the single
most important one for not cutting wages in a recession.
mcrease m pnces than to a real wage decrease caused by a cut in nominal wages.
In partIcular, workers appear to react less strongly and WIth a longer lag to a real
wage decrease that results from an increase m prices than to a real wage decrease
that results from a cut in nommal wages In Kahnernan, Knetseh, and Thaler's
sUIvey, 62 percent of respondents claImed that It was unfair for a firm in an area
WIth hIgh unemployment and no mflation to cut wages by 7 percent, but only 22
percent felt that It was unfaIr for the same firm to raIse wages by only 5 percent
when the mflation rate IS 12 percent. Campbell found that mdustry qUIt rates are
determmed by the real wage m the long run However, qUIts were found to respond much more qUIckly to a change in mdustry wages than to a change m aggregate wages or aggregate prIces, which means that nommal wages have a greater
effect 011 qUIts m the short run In decIdmg how much effort to prOVIde, workers
may SImIlarly respond more strongly to the real wage In the long run but to the
nom mal wage In the short run.
S. The exact wordIng of the questIOn was, "In recent years economIsts have
developed several theones to explam why firms normally do not cut wages to the
lowest level at wll1ch they can find the necessary number of qualIfied applIcants
dUrIng a recession The questIons below are related to these varIOUS theones If
your firm does not cut wages as low as pOSSIble durmg a recession, please IndIcate
bow Important each of these theones IS m explainIng why you do not"
Note that we asked about cuttlllg wages in a recession rather than about
cuttmg wages m response to a fall in demand for the firm's output. CompetItIve
theory predIcts that a firm's labor supply curve is a honzontallme at the market
wage, so that wages will be ngid m response to a change m demand for a firm's
output If the unemployment rate remams constant. However, standard competItive theory offers no good explanation of why wages mIght be rigId III r!'sponse to
a rIse III the aggregate unemployment rate
SIX out of the 1S4 respondents dId not answer thIS questIOn One of these
respondents wrote, "Cutting wages Just isn't the way to treat your workforce,"
another replIed, "Our rate of mcrease IS conSIstent WIth receSSIon," and a thIrd
smd the questIOn was not applIcable. The other three respondents dId not explalll
why they dId not answer the questIOn
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Table IV reports the average score received by each of the
statements for all firms and the average scores for Business Week
(BW) and non-Business Week (NBW) firms.9 Cases where at-test
indicates that the mean scores are significantly different (at the
5 percent level) between occupational groups or between the vanous subsamples of firms (as discussed m Section II) are denoted
with the notation at the bottom of the table. Also reported is the
percentage of respondents who considered each explanation to be
the most important factor.
Many statements receIVed strong support, suggesting that
the work of economists in recent years has not been completely
misdirected. The statement receiving the highest score for all occupational groups was statement g, "If your firm were to cut
wages, your most productive workers might leave, whereas if you
layoff workers, you can layoff the least productive workers," as
predicted by the adverse selection model as it applies to quits.
In fact, in all but one case it received the highest score for all
occupational groups in both the Busmess Week and non-Business
Week subsamples. In the aggregate sample, t-tests indicate that
its mean score is significantly higher (at the 5 percent level) than
the mean score for any other statement for white-collar workers
and for all but statement d (whIch deals with the effect of wages
on effort) for blue-collar and less skilled workers. Furthermore,
this statement always received the highest percentage of respondents reporting this as the most important reason for not cutting
wages in a recession, and it often outperformed the second
ranked explanation by at least a 2 to 1 margin. IO
Blinder and Choi [1990] and Bewley [1994,1995] did not find
strong support for the adverse selection model in their studies. 11
9 Two dIfferent verSIOns of the survey were sent to respondents, wIth the
order of these statements diffenng between the two verSIOns. Out of 27 cases
(mne statements times three occupational groups), the means were sIgmficantly
dIfferent (at the 5 percent level) between the two verSIOns m only one case
10 ConSIstent WIth these results, Gibbons and Katz [1991] found that the
dIfference between the predisplacement and post dIsplacement earnmgs of whItecollar workers was SIgnIficantly greater for workers dIsplaced by layoffs than for
workers dIsplaced by plant closmgs. They attnbuted thIS findmg to the fact that
all workers, regardless of abIlIty, lose theIr Job m a plant closing, whereas a firm
laymg off workers often has some dIscretion m whom to layoff. Thus, firms WIll
generally layoff theIr least productive workers, and other firms WIll VIew thIS
layoff as a negative SIgnal about the worker's unobserved abIlIty. No such negative
sIgnal IS generated, however, when a firm closes an entIre plant
11 On the other hand, some respondents m Agell and Lundborg's [1995]
study mdicated that they mIght conSIder an indIvidual offenng to underbId exIstmg workers as havmg infenor skills
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TABLE IV
AVERAGE SCORE RECEIVED FOR EACH STATEMENT (4 = VERY IMPORTANT, 3 =
MODERATELY IMPORTANT, 2 = OF MINOR IMPORTANCE, 1 = NOT IMPORTANT) AND
PEHCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS RATING EACH STATEMENT AS THE MOST IMPORTANT
REASON (HANK IS IN PARENTHESES)
Average score

Percentage
rankmgeach
statement as
most Important

Overall

Busmess
Week

NonBusmess
Week

135
(9)
2.40
(7)
2.05
(8t)

1.32
(9)
2.64
(5)
2.29
(6)

1.39
(9)
194
(9)
1.64
(9)

47%
(7t)
229%
(2)
132%
(4)

259
(5)
2.79
(3)
260
(3)

2.72
(5)
276
(3)
2.69
(3)

2.38
(5)
2.85
(3t)
2.44
(5)

9.6%
(5)
117%
(4t)
162%
(2)

230
(7)
236
(8)
220
(7)

256
(7)
253
(6)
247
(5)

1.87
(8)
197
(8)

55%
(6)
21%

171

34%
(7)

a Labor unIOn contracts
prevent wages from bemg
cut
WhIte-collar"
Blue-collar"'"
Less skllledu,I,'
b, Workers dlshke
unpredIctable changes III
mcome Therefore, workers
and firms reach an Imphclt
understandmg that wages
will neIther fall m recessions
nor nse In expansIOns
WhIte-collar" I
Blue-collar
Less skIlled
c. If your firm were to cut
wages, people m the
commumty would hear
about It, makmg It more
dIfficult to hIre workers m
the future.
Whlte-collarl
Bl ue-collarl
Less skIliedl

(8)
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TABLEN
(CONTINUED)

Average score

Percentage
rankIng each
statement as
most Important

Overall

Busmess
Week

NonBusmess
Week

2.77
(4)
2.99
(2)
288
(2)

277
(4)
294
(2)
2.86
(2)

277
(4)
3.12
(1)
292
(2)

103%
(4)
154%
(3)
154%
(3)

296
(2)
273
(4)
256
(4)

295
(2)
268
(4)
256
(4)

297
(2)
285
(3t)
2.55
(4)

116%
(3)
117%
(4t)
9.4%
(5)

182
(8)
2.16
(9)
205
(8t)

177
(8)
220
(9)
2.11
(8)

191
(7)
209
(7)
194
(7)

07%
(9)
1 1'70
(9)
17%
(8t)

d. A cut m wages would
decrease workers' effort,
resultmg m less output or
poorer servIce
WhIte-collar
Blue-collar*
Less skIlled
e A cut m wages would
Increase number of workers
who qwt, IncreaSIng the cost
of hITIng and trammg new
workers m the future
WhIte-collar**
Blue-collar
Less skIlled'
f If your finn were to
dIscharge some of Its current
workers and to hIre new
workers at a lower wage, the
workers who remam would
harass and refuse to
cooperate wIth the newly
hIred workers
WhIte-collar
Blue-collar""
Less skIlled",'

Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

TABLE IV
(CONTINUED)

Average score

Overall

Business
Week

NonBusmess
Week

Percentage
ranking each
statement as
most Important

g. If your firm were to cut
wages, your most productIve
workers mIght leave,
whereas If you layoff
workers, you can layoff the
least productIve workers
White-collar
Blue-collar
Less skIlled n "

3.27
(1)
3.13
(1)
3.10
(1)

335
(1)
316
(1)
313

2.85
(3)
2.50
(5)
2 24

3.13
(1)

408%
(1)
266%

(1)

3.07
(2)
3 04
(1)

346%
(1)

281
(3)
2 35
(8)
2 05
(9)

2.93
(3)
2.82
(5)
2.57
(3)

129%
(2)
64%
(6)
3.8%
(6)

(1)

h. Workers who have been
wIth the firm for a long tIme
have learned how the firm
operates and have formed
relationships WIth coworkers
and clIents A cut m wages
may cause some of your
long-tIme employees to
leave, and theIr
replacements would not
have this InSIde knowledge
of the firm.
WhIte-collar" .Blue-collar",m,'
Less skilled",m

(5)
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TABLE IV
(CONTINUED)

Average score

Overall

BusIness
Week

NonBusIness
Week

2.52
(6)
248
(6)
2.23
(6)

2.64
(6)
2.50
(7)
2.28
(7)

233
(6)
244
(6)
215
(6)

Percentage
rankmg each
statement as
most Important

Independent of the effect
of wage cuts on profits,
people m management
posItIons would be reluctant
to cut wages m order to
aVOId employees' resentment
toward them.
1

WhIte-collar"·I'
Blue-collaru '
Less skIlled u

4.8%
(7t)

2.1%
(7t)

17%
(8t)

uS1gmficantly greater (at the 5 percent level) for heavIly umomzed than for less umoD1.led finns
nS1gmficantly gredter for less umomzed firms than fOl heaVIly umomzed firms
lSlgmficantly greater for large finns than for small and ffildslzed firms
omSlgmficantly greater for small and IDldslzed firms than for large firms
"Slgmficantly greater for firms producmg servICes than for firms producmg goods
'Slgmficantiy greater for thl<;; occupatIOnal group than for the group recelVmg the lowest average score
"Slgmficantlj greater for thlS occupahonal group than for both other occupatIOnal groups

However, their studies considered adverse selectlOn as it applies
to new hires, while our study considers adverse selection as it
applies to qUltS. I2 Thus, while there does not appear to be a
strong correlation between workers' productivity and their reservation wage, workers' productivity does appear to be correlated
with their propensity to quit.
For white-collar workers, strong support was also found for
the hypothesis that firms keep wages rigid because they fear a
cut in wages would increase the number of quits. Both e, which
deals with the explicit cost of hiring and training replacements if
workers quit, and h, which deals with the loss of firm-specific human capital if workers quit, received strong support for these
workers. Interestingly, models involving explicit costs of hiring
12 In fact, Blmder and ChOI [1990, P 1007] state, "We VIew [these findings]
as damagmg eVIdence agamst the adverse-selectIOn model. unless . adverse
selectIon apphes only to qUIts, not to new hIres"
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and training new workers have received much more attention
from economists than models involving the loss of firm-specific
human capital, although our survey finds almost as much support for firm-specific human capital as for hiring and training
costs. Also receiving reasonably strong support for white-collar
workers is statement d, "A cut in wages would decrease workers'
effort, resulting in less output or poorer service."
For blue-collar and less skilled workers, strong support was
found for explanations in which wages affect effort and for implicit contract theory, as evidenced by the scores for statements d
and b. In addition, hiring and training costs appear to be a reasonably important factor in explaining wage rigidity for bluecollar and less skilled workers, although less of a factor than for
white-collar workers.
Note that theories involving the effect of wages on quits do a
better job of explaining the rigidity of white-collar wages, while
theories emphasizing the effect of wages on effort are better at
explaining wage rigidity for blue-collar and less skilled workers.
There are several possible explanations for this finding. First,
white-collar workers perform jobs that are more challenging and
less standardized between firms, making hiring and training
costs higher for white-collar workers than for other workers and
making the productivity of white-collar workers more dependent
on their tenure with the firm. Second, Agell and Lundborg [1995]
found that white-collar workers are more likely to quit than to
reduce their effort in response to a wage cut, while a wage cut
would affect both effort and quits for blue-collar workers. Third,
the results elsewhere in this study indicate that the effort of
white-collar workers is less responsive to a cut in wages than is
the effort of other workers.
The other explanations received less support than the ones
discussed above in explaining wage rigidity. Moderate support
was found for statement c, which deals with the effect of wage
cuts on the firm's reputation and thus on its ability to hire workers in the future. Moderate support was also found for statement
1, which was included to account for the possibility that keeping
wages rigid does not maximize profits but instead results from
the desire of individuals responsible for setting wages to avoid
resentment directed at them. The fact that statement i received
lower scores than most of the other statements suggests that not
cutting wages in an economic downturn is profit-maximizing behavior for most firms.
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Explanations based on contract theory and insider-outsider
theory received weak support, as evidenced by the scores for
statements a and f. Both these statements, however, received
much stronger support in firms that are more than 30 percent
unionized. In these firms, statement a received average scores of
3.81 for blue-collar workers and 3.61 for less skilled workers, and
statement f received average scores of 2.65 for blue-collar workers and 2.70 for less skilled workers. In additIOn, responses to
questions elsewhere in the survey (whIch are not reported, but
are available upon request) suggest that insider-outsIder theory
has much greater power to explain the behavior of union workers
than of nonunion workers. However, a less literal interpretation
of insider-outsider theory may have more power to explain the
wage-setting process for nonunion workers. While these workers
may not explicitly harass or refuse to cooperate with new entrants, they may reduce their productivity in more subtle ways,
such as slowmg down the speed at which they tram them. In addition, incumbent workers may choose to provide less effort when
their former coworkers are replaced by new entrants hired at a
lower wage.
In comparing the average scores between the different subsamples offirms, we found similar averages for many statements.
In some cases, however, we found sIgnificant differences. The
reputational effects of a wage cut did substantially better at explaining wage rigidity for large firms than for small firms, probably because the actions of larger firms receive greater publicity.
Firm-specific human capital received higher scores at smaller
firms than at large firms and higher scores at firms producing
servIces than at firms producing goods. A plausible explanation
for these findmgs is that jobs are less standardized between firms
in service-producing industries than in goods-producing industries and are less standardized in small firms than in large firms,
making workers' productivity more dependent on their tenure
with the firm.13

13 The responses to the statements m Table IV and to the questlOns in the
rest of the survey were regressed on the firm's SIze, the firm's umomzatlOn rate,
and mdustry dummy vanables A list of cases m whIch these vanables are Slgmficant at the 5 percent level IS aVailable from the authors upon request
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QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS

In this section we report the responses to questions that address the assumptions of the explanations receiving the strongest
support in Table IV. 14 However, we do not deal with the assumptions of models involving turnover costs and the loss of firmspecific human capital, since the effect of wages on quits, a key
component of these models, can be measured empirically.15

A The Effect of Wages on Effort
Strong support was found in Table IV for the idea that firms
fear a wage cut would reduce their workers' effort. While adverse
selection received the strongest support from survey participants,
we discuss the effect of wages on effort first, because the discussion of adverse selection draws on the responses to questions in
this subsection. ThIS subsection considers the reasons why wages
may affect workers' effort and the nature of the relationship between wages and effort.
Economists have suggested several possible reasons why effort may depend on wages. In Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] a higher
wage raises the cost of job loss, thereby inducing fewer workers
to shirk. In the gift-exchange models of Akerlof [1982, 1984] and
the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990], workers' effort depends on their gratitude and loyalty to the firm,
which, in turn, depends on their wage. Gift-exchange theory and
fair wage theory differ slightly in that effort depends on the firm's
wage relative to workers' outside opportunities in the former, and
depends on the firm's wage relative to workers' perceived fair
wage in the latter,16 but they will be considered as a single explanation in this study.
To ascertain whether respondents viewed shirking or gratitude and fairness as more relevant in explaining why a cut in
wages would reduce effort, we posed the following question to respondents who previously indicated that effort would fall if wages
were cut: 17
14 A summary of the questIOns and responses that are not reported m thIS
study is avaIlable from the authors upon request.
15. See, for example, Campbell [1993, 1995a, 1995b]
16. Several factors, such as the profitabIlIty of the firm, wages of other workers at the same firm, and past wages, have no effect on workers' outsIde opportumties but may affect their perceIved falr wage
17. The order of the questIOns on the survey was dIfferent from the order m
whIch they are presented m thIS study
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1. Economists have discussed two reasons why cuttmg wages
might lower workers' effort. One is that workers will feel less
gratitude and loyalty to the firm and will not work as hard in
return. A second is that workers who are paId less will be less
concerned about losing their jobs and thus will not work as hard.
Which reason bests explains why effort would fall If you were to
cut wages?

Gratitude and loyalty
Less concern about
job loss
Both reasons about
equally important

Overall
69.2%

BW
79.2%

NBW
51.7%

4.4%

1.0%

10.3%

26.4%

19.8%

37.9%

It thus appears that the relationship between wages and effort is
more a function of a wage cut's effect on workers' morale than of
its effect on the cost of shirking. To further explore the lmportance of shirking, Question 2 asked respondents to rank in order
of importance three of five factors that may be important in keepmg workers from shirking. Reported are average scores calculated by assigning 5 points for a first place rank, 4 points for a
second place rank, and 3 points for a third place rank. Also reported is the percentage of respondents ranking each response as
the most important factor:
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2. Below is a list of some things that economists believe may be
important in keeping workers from slacking off on the job.
a. high unemployment
b. high wages
c. good management-worker relationships
d. good working conditions
e. close supervision by supervisors
Please indicate below which of these factors are the most important in keeping your workers from slacking off on the job.
% respondmg most

HIgh unemployment
HIgh wages
Good managementworker relatIOnshIps
Good working
condItions
Close superVISIOn by
superVIsors

Average score
BC
LS
WC
121
1.23
1.27
2.77
2.92
310

WC
9.7%
133%

Important
BC
10.1%
25.7%

88%
25.5%

LS

4.39

3.96

3.58

661%

46.8%

43.8%

2.82

2.74

257

91%

147%

10.2%

0.53

086

167

1.8%

2.8%

11.7%

High wages ranked well behind good management-worker relationships for all groups of workers. In addition, high unemployment and close supervision, two factors also emphasized by the
shirking literature, were given low ranks by respondents. The responses to Questions 1 and 2 suggest that the fear of job loss is
not the primary reason why wages affect effort. Consistent with
our results, Blinder and Choi [1990] and Bewley [1994, 1995]
found little support for the shirking model, and Agell and Lundborg [1995] found that shirking is not very common and that most
shirkers are not dismissed. The poor performance of the shirking
model in this and other surveys is noteworthy, since the shirking
model has probably received the most attention of the models in
the efficiency wage literature.
The responses to other questions in our survey also demonstrate that firms view workers' perception of fairness as significantly affecting their effort. The following question, asked of
respondents who previously indicated that a wage cut would reduce workers' effort, illustrates the importance of the firm's
profitability on workers' perceived fair wage:
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3. Again, supposing that wages were cut by 10%, do you think the
amount that workers' effort would decrease would be different if
workers believed the firm were losing money than if workers believed the firm were highly profitable?

A great deal
A moderate
amount

WhIte-collar
Overall BW
NBW
660% 618%
750%

Blue-collar
Overall BW
NBW
510% 487%
571%

Less skIlled
Overall BW
NBW
328% 360% 262%

220%

255%

146%

346%

368%

286%

383%

360%

429%

53%
67%

69%
59%

21%
83%

96%
48%

105%
39%

71%
71%

172%
11 7%

221'*
58%

71%
238%

To a mlnor

degree
No

The effect of profits on workers' perceived fair wage can explain
why previous research has found that the profitability of a firm
is a significant determinant of its wages. I8 One should note, however, that another possible reason why a wage cut would have a
smaller effect on effort at a firm losing money is that workers at
such a firm would be more worried about losing their jobs.
Another determinant of a worker's perceived fair wage appears to be the wages of other workers at the same firm, as illustrated by the responses to Questions 4 and 5:
4. Suppose your firm mcreased the wages of your better paId
workers without raising the wages of workers who are paid less.
Do you feel this would have an adverse effect on the effort and
morale of the workers receiving lower wages?

A great deal
A moderate amount
A small amount
No

Overall
50.6%
35.0%
10.8%
3.6%

BW
52.8%
38.0%
7.9%
1.4%

NBW
47.2%
30.6%
15.3%
6.9%

18 Th,s Issue IS d,scussed at length III Carruth and Oswald [1989], wh,ch
summanzes the results of past research and presents new results
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5. Suppose your firm increased the wages of your workers who
are paid less without raising the wages of your better paid workers. Do you feel this would have an adverse effect on the effort
and morale of the workers receiving higher wages?

A great deal
A moderate amount
A small amount
No

Overall
33.9%
36.1%
21.9%
8.1%

BW
32.4%
42.6%
19.9%
5.1%

NBW
36.1%
26.4%
25.0%
12.5%

It thus appears that workers compare their wage with the wages
of workers paid both more than themselves and less than themselves, but that they view the wages of workers paid more than
themselves as the more relevant comparison. 19
The president of a small manufacturing company provided
us with anecdotal evidence of how a worker's perception of his
fair wage may affect his attitude. An employee at his firm was
satisfied with his job and with the salary he was earning. Then
one day he saw an incoming fax containing the salaries of other
members of his department, and he discovered that some of his
coworkers were earning considerably more than himself. After
seeing this fax, he became dissatisfied with his salary, and his
morale noticeably worsened.
We next examine the relationship between wages and effort,
because this relationship may play an important role in the wagesetting behavior of firms. Three key issues are how much a
change in wages will affect effort, whether workers respond differently to wage cuts than to wage increases, and whether effort
is more related to wage levels or wage changes.
To investigate the degree to which wages affect effort and the
possibility of asymmetries in this effect, we asked respondents
the following questions: 20
19 Akerlof and Yellen [1990] report the findmgs of an experiment perfonned
by Martm [1981], in whIch technicIans were asked whose pay they would most
lIke to know for a companson WIth theIr own pay the hIghest or lowest pay of
techmcIans or the hIghest, average, or lowest pay of supervIsors Most respondents answered that they would be most interested m knowmg the pay of the
hIghest level of technicians If a firm faces a shock that lowers the demand for
some workers but not the demand for other workers, workers' concerns about
relatIve wages wIthm the finn can explam wage ngidIty for the first group of
workers
20 In half of the surveys, QuestIon 7 appeared before Question 6 The average responses were not sIgnificantly different between the two verSIOns of the
survey
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6. Suppose you were to cut wages by 10%. By approximately what
percentage (if at all) would you expect workers' effort to fall as a
result of this cut in wages?

Mean
MedIan
>0%
2:10%

WhIte-collar
Overall
BW
NBW
154% 150% 169%
10.0% 100% 150%
858% 895% 720%
61.7% 616% 640%

Blue-collar
Overall
BW
NBW
194% 193% 198%
150% 150% 200%
920% 957% 765%
747% 771% 647%

Less skIlled
Overall
BW
NBW
227% 211% 277%
200% 180% 200%
913% 937% 840%
788% 785% 800%

7. Suppose you were to raise wages by 10%. By approximately
what percentage (if at all) would you expect workers' effort to rise
as a result ofthe wage increase?

Mean
MedIan
>0%
~10%

WhIte-collar
Blue-collar
Overall
NBW Overall
BW
BW
NBW
6.6%
65%
71%
64%
67%
52%
25%
22%
375% 175% 00%
50%
558% 545% 607% 521% 467% 714%
194% 188% 214% 187% 187% 190%

Less skIlled
Overall
NBW
BW
69%
62%
89%
10%
00%
25%
532% 464% 741%
225% 190% 333%

Respondents expected that the effect of wages on effort would be
strongly asymmetric. On the downward side a substantial majority of respondents believed that a 10 percent wage cut would decrease effort by at least 10 percent. In addition, their responses
indicated that they believed the effort of less skilled workers
would be the most affected by a wage cut, while the effort of
white-collar workers would be the least affected. A possible explanation for this finding IS that workers performing jobs that require greater skill are motivated more by the challenge and
enjoyment of their work than by their wage.
On the upward side, only about one-fifth of the respondents
felt that a 10 percent wage increase would raise workers' effort
by at least 10 percent, close to half the respondents felt that a 10
percent wage increase would have no effect on effort, and the median responses were close to zero While the mean responses were
greater than the median responses, the means were greatly affected by the presence of a few outliers.21 Nine respondents who
expected a wage increase to raise effort volunteered that the rise
in effort would be only temporary. Since the survey did not ask
whether the increase would be permanent or temporary, the fact
21 FIve mdIV1duals gave responses between 50 percent and 100 percent.
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that nine respondents made this comment is noteworthy. A plausible explanation for the large asymmetries between a wage increase and a wage decrease is that workers view wage cuts as
unfair and that people value losses much more than they value
equivalent gains, a psychological phenomenon supported by research discussed in Knetsch [1995].
Question 8 asked respondents to compare the effect of the
level of the wage with the effect of a decrease in the wage:
8. Consider the following two situations:
A. Assume that for the past five years, you paid wages that
were 10% lower than the wages you actually paid. (For
example, if your firm paid wages of $10/hour from 1990
to 1994, assume that you instead paid wages of $9/hour
from 1990 to 1994.)
B. Assume that for the previous four years, you had paid the
same wages that you actually paid, and then cut wages
by 10% in the current year. (For example, if your firm
paid wages of $10/hour from 1990 to 1994, assume that
you paid wages of $10/hour from 1990 to 1993, but then
cut wages to $9/hour in 1994.)
In which situation would you expect workers' effort and morale
to be worse?

A
B
No difference

Overall
11.0%
84.1%
4.9%

BW
10.1%
853%
4.6%

NBW
12.3%
82.2%
5.5%

The overwhelming majority of respondents expected that workers' effort and morale would be worse if their firm cut wages than
if their firm had paid lower wages for the past five years. In both
cases it was assumed that the current wage was 10 percent below
its actual level. The fact that workers appear to respond more
strongly to a wage cut than to low wages, per se, suggests that
the ratio of a worker's current wage to his or her past wage is an
important determinant of the worker's effort. This finding corroborates the work of Bewley [1994, 1995], who found that respondents reported a much stronger relationship between workers'
morale and wage decreases than between workers' morale and
wage levels, and it supports the statement of Kahneman,
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Knetsch, and Thaler [1986, p. 730] that "the current wage of an
employee serves as reference for evaluating the fairness of future
adjustments of that employee's wage."
Overall, firms appear to believe that wages have a strong effect on effort by affecting workers' attitudes toward their employer. And it is possIble that even a small change m effort could
have a large effect on profits at firms that are more technically
advanced, giving these firms a strong incentIve to pay wages that
are perceived as fair. The results of this survey also suggest that
the molding of workers' attitudes is a complex process, with past
wages, the firm's profits, and wages of other workers at the same
firm all being Important factors in a worker's perception of
fmrness.

B. Adverse Selectwn
The strongest support in Table IV was found for adverse selection as it pertains to quits, implymg that productivity and quit
propensity are positIvely correlated. Note that these will be POSItIVely correlated only if firms do not pay wages that are equal to
workers' productivity. (OtherWIse, firms would be indifferent
about which workers quit and whIch workers they layoff.) To explore the propOSItIon that wage differentials are smaller than
productivity differentials, Question 9 presented the following
scenario:
9. Suppose you had two employees working together, with identical ages, working experIence, and educations. But suppose that
employee A were 20% more productive than employee B. How
much more do you think you would pay employee A relative to
employee B? [Respondents were given a range of pay dIfferentials, and we converted these into a single number, usmg the midpomts of the ranges. 22 ]
WhIte-collar
Blue-collar
Less skIlled
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW
12.2% 11.5% 13.6% 8.9%
8.3% 10.2% 8.8%
7 5'10 11.1%
22 The ranges were 0 percent, 1-7 percent, 8-14 percent. 15-19 percent, 20
percent, and more than 20 percent We converted these ranges to 0 percent, 4
percent, 11 percent, 17 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent The percentage of
re"ponses lymg wlthm each range (from lowest to hIghest) was 3 1 percent, 20 8
percent, 42 9 percent, 12 1 percent, 12 7 percent, and 8.4 percent for whIte-collar
workers, 21 8 percent, 25 5 percent, 28.2 percent, 11 8 percent, 8 2 percent, and
4 5 percent for blue-collar workers; and 22 0 percent, 26 5 percent, 28 0 percent,
5 6 percent, 15.7 percent, and 2 2 percent for less skIlled workers
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On average, respondents indicated that the pay differential
would equal only about half the differential in productivity. In
some cases respondents were asked why they would not pay the
more productive worker 20 percent more, and the answer most
often given was that a large pay differential would be bad for
morale. 21 Note that keeping wage differentials smaller than productivity differentials is optimal behavior for firms only if workers care more about the wages of workers paid more than
themselves than of workers paid less than themselves, a proposition supported by our previous results.
One objection that may be raised concerning adverse selection in quits as an explanation for wage rigidity is that firms
could cut wages for only less productive workers and leave the
wages of the more productive workers unchanged. However, as
discussed above, workers appear to be particularly sensitive to
changes in the wage distribution within the firm, so that such a
policy could reduce the effort of less productive workers much
more than an across-the-board cut in wages would reduce their
effort.
Another possible objection is that an aggregate shock should
affect wages at all firms equally, so that a worker's outside market opportunities should move one-for-one with the wage at his
or her current firm. If this occurs, there would be no incentive for
a firm's most productive workers to quit in response to a cut in
wages that results from an aggregate shock. However, our previous results suggest that workers react strongly to behavior they
consider unfair. Workers who know that they could earn more at
another firm, but who would normally prefer to remain at their
present firm because of the nonpecuniary benefits they derive
from working there, may decide to leave their present firm iftheir
wages are cut. In addition, if workers are uncertain about wages
at other firms, a cut in wages may provide the incentive for them
to undertake the cost of exploring outside opportunities.24
23 Conslstent with the answers of our respondents, Frank [1984] exammed
the wages and producbvitles of sales workers and univerSIty professors and concluded that the most productIve workers are paid less than theIr marginal products, while the least productive workers are paId more than theIr margmal
products In additIOn, Bewley [1994, 1995] found that firms generally do not hire
new workers at wages substantially below the wages of theIr current employees
because firms fear that the new workers would resent being paId less than workers hIred earher, adversely affectmg theIr morale and loyalty to the firm.
24 ConSIstent WIth the propOSItIon that workers have greater knowledge of
their own wage than of aggregate wages, Campbell [1995a] found that the qUit
rates of workers m an mdustry respond WIth a much shorter lag to mdustry wages
than to aggregate wages.
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Contract Theory

In implicit contract models, workers are risk-averse and prefer a stable wage to one that varies over the business cycle, so
that a firm offering a stable wage could on average pay a lower
wage than a firm that always paid a wage equal to workers' marginal revenue product. Therefore, firms and workers reach an implicit understanding that wages will remam stable, even though
workers' marginal revenue product may vary. The average scores
received for statement b in Table IV and the responses in this
subsection show reasonably strong support among survey respondents for implicit contracts in explaining wage rigidity.
The responses to the following question suggest that firms
believe workers prefer stable wages to varying wages:
10. Suppose your firm had a policy of cutting wages m a receSSIOn
and raising wages in an economic expansion, but on average you
paid the same wage as you currently do. Do you think it would
be more difficult to attract new applicants to the firm than with
your current policies?

No
Somewhat
more dIfficult
Moderately
more dIfficult
Much more
dIfficult

WhIte-collar
Overall
NBW
BW
128%
95% 186%

Blue-collar
NBW
Overall
BW
143% 114%
134%

Less sktlled
Overall
BW
NBW
224% 239 ck, 191%

146%

152%

136%

125'7c

156%

57%

157%

170%

149%

213%

219%

203%

232%

247%

200%

201%

216'1c

170%

512%

533%

475%

509'7{

455'7c

629'70

418%

375%

489%

However, some caution should be used in interpreting these results
as evidence that workers are risk-averse, as another possible reason why firms paying varying wages would have more trouble in
attracting workers is that workers view wage cuts as unfair.
There are two basic problems with implicit contract theory
The first is that workers receiving a stable wage will face a
greater chance of unemployment during a recession. Why then
would implicIt contracts specify a stable wage instead of stable
employment? One possible reason is that workers prefer a stable
wage to stable employment prospects since a worker whose wage
is cut receives no benefits, whereas an unemployed worker may
25 Note that the total compensatIon of workers WIll be hIgher If a firm lays
off workers than If It cuts wages or cuts the hours of every worker, smce laIdoff workers are elIgible for unemployment compensatIon, whereas workers whose
wages or hours are cut are not ebgIble.
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receive unemployment compensation,25 time to look for a new job,
and leisure time. To determine what firms believe about workers'
preferences, we asked the following question:
11. Suppose the economy were in a recession and you gave your
workers the following choice:
A. a 10% wage cut
B. a 10% chance of losing their jobs and a 90% chance of
remaining with your firm with no pay cut.
Which do you think most of your employees would choose?

10% wage cut
10% chance
oflosmgJoh
Not sure

Wh,te-collar
NBW
Overall
BW
428% 381% 508%
404%
169%

Blue-collar
Overall
BW
NBW
407% 392% 441%

429% 361%
190% 131%

381%
212%

354%
253%

441%
118%

Less skllled
Overall
BW
NBW
404% 379% 449%
397%
199%

322% 531%
299%
20%

On this issue respondents were split almost down the middle.
Thus, a sizable number of respondents did view workers as preferring employment cuts to wage cuts.
Another reason why workers may prefer a stable wage to stable employment prospects is asymmetric information between
firms and workers. This asymmetric information means that implicit contracts giving firms greater latitude in setting the wage
than in setting the level of employment might give employers an
incentive to falsely claim that product demand is weak. Thus,
employment cuts may be needed to prove to workers that demand
for the firm's output has actually fallen, in order to make them
more accepting of wage cuts. The following question asked respondents about the plausibility of this idea:
12. Some economists have claimed that if firms cut wages more
and employment less in a recessIOn, then workers would not believe that demand for the firm's product or service has really
fallen. Thus, employment cuts are needed to make workers more
accepting of wage cuts. How plausible does this seem to you?
Overall
Very
11.5%
Moderately 28.4%
To a small
degree
26.7%
Not very
33.3%

BW
NBW
5.0% 205%
30.7% 25.3%
297% 22.6%
34.7% 31.5%

Employ. Employ.
2- 1000
<1000
5.6% 212%
306% 250%
29.6%
343%

22.0%
31.8%
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Serv,ceGoodsproducmg producmg
50%
149%
267%
29.4%
35.0%
33.3%

224%
333%
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This idea was viewed as moderately or very plausIble by 39.9 percent of the respondents. Particularly interesting is the difference
between firms on this issue, with service-producing firms finding
this idea more plausible than goods-producing firms and smaller
firms finding this idea more plausible than large firms. The difference between goods-producing and service-producing firms is
probably explained by the fact that the output of goods-producmg
firms is more tangible so that workers in these firms have a more
accurate idea of the demand for the firm's product. As the president of a manufacturing firm told us, "our workers know how
much of our product they're shipping." The difference between
larger firms and smaller firms may result from the fact that a
greater proportion of shocks to smaller firms are idiosyncratic, so
that aggregate economic data provide less information about the
demand for the output of these firms.
A second problem with implicit contract models is that implicit contracts are not, by nature, legally binding. However,
economists have proposed two mechanisms that may give firms
an incentive not to violate an implicit contract: a firm that cuts
wages in a recession will experience a decrease in effort by its
current workers and will acquire a negative reputation, making
it more difficult to hire workers in the future. 26 The responses in
Table IV suggest that firms view the effect of a wage cut on the
effort of current workers as a much greater deterrent than the
effect of a wage cut on the firm's reputatIOn. While this motive
appears to be similar to firms' motive for not cuttmg wages in
fair wage models, there is an important difference between these
explanations. Fair wage theory suggests that wage cuts reduce
effort because workers VIew a wage cut as unfair by its very nature, while implicit contract theory suggests that wage cuts reduce effort because workers view a wage cut as a violation of an
implicit understanding between their employer and themselves.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The most important results of this study are the strong support found for two explanations of wage rigidity: adverse selection
as it applies to qUItS and the dependence of effort on wages. When
respondents were asked to assess the importance of various
26 See Azanadls and Shghtz [19831, Hart [19831, and StIgiltz [1986] for dIScussions of thIS Issue
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statements in explaining why they normally do not cut wages as
low as possible in a recession, the response receiving the highest
score for all three occupational groups was that a firm cutting
wages would probably lose its most productive workers, whereas
a firm laying off workers can layoff its least productive workers.
Respondents also gave high scores to the effect of wages on
effort as an explanation for wage rigidity. This effect appears to be
particularly strong when workers feel that they are being
paid less than their fair wage. Many factors appear to affect a
worker's perception of the fairness of his or her pay, including the
worker's past wages, the profitability of the firm, the wages
of workers performing similar Jobs at the firm, and the wages of
workers in different occupations at the firm. Given the complexities involved with the concept of fairness, incorporating fairness
into models of wage-setting will be a difficult task.
Workers' concerns about fairness can explain why the adverse selection model provides such a strong explanation for wage
rigidity. Most firms appear to keep wage differentials between
workers smaller than productivity differentials because they are
concerned that large wage differentials for similar workers would
be harmful to morale. Since wages are not equal to productivity,
firms would rather layoff their least productive workers than
lose their most productive workers through quits.
Strong support was also found for explanations in which
wages affect the number of workers who quit, particularly for
white-collar workers. While most previous research on the effect
of labor turnover on a firm's wage policy has concentrated on the
explicit costs of hiring and training new workers, this study reveals that firms fear the loss of firm-specific human capital when
experienced workers quit almost as much as they fear the cost of
hiring and training replacements.
Implicit contract theory emerged as a reasonable explanation
for wage rigidity, as many respondents indicated that an implicit
understanding with workers to keep wages stable over the business cycle is an important reason for not cutting wages in a recession. Our results reveal that firms' greatest incentive for not
breaking an implicit contract is their fear that workers would
provide less effort rather than their concern for their reputation.
A literal interpretation of insider-outsider theory appears to
have more power to explain wage-setting behavior in heavily unionized firms than in firms in which unionization rates are lower.
It thus might be a better explanation for unemployment in Euro-

Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

786

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

pean countries, where unionization rates are typically much
higher than in the United States.
Finally, it is interesting to note that simllar results were
found wlth the Business Week and non-Business Week subsampIes, even though these subsamples were obtained quite differently. In addition, the conclusions of this study are similar to the
conclusions of other studies, even though these studies have differed greatly in their sampling techniques, sample size, industrial compositIOn of firms, and style of question. All surveys of
wage rigidity have found that concerns for fairness play an important role in explaining why firms normally refrain from cutting wages in recessionary periods. In addition, surveys that have
exammed the issue of turnover costs have found strong support
for explanatIOns emphasizing workers' quit behavior. Consistent
with the results of the present study, past studles have found little support for explanatIOns emphasizing shirking in explaining
wage rigidity. There lS some disagreement as to the importance
of adverse selectIOn, although the studies that found evidence
against it exammed adverse selection as it relates to new hires,
not to quits. The fact that such similar conclusions have been
reached by recent surveys, which have used different sample
populations and have asked different questions, should give us
confidence in accepting these conclusions as valid explanations of
wage ngidity.
ApPENDIX

Respondents for the present study were obtamed from several sources. Most of the respondents were compensation professIOnals at Business Week 1000 firms who were listed in the
American Compensation Association's Membership Directory.
This sample is similar to that used in Levine [1993]. As in Levine,
if a company had more than one compensation officer, the survey
was sent to the one whom we perceived to be the highest ranking
Surveys were sent to 584 compensation professionals from Business Week 1000 companies (the remaining firms had no compensation personnel listed in the ACA's MembershIp Directory), and
111 surveys were returned, for a response rate of 19 0 percent.27
27 The response rate to Levme's [1993] survey was over 40 percent A posSIble reason why the response rate to our survey was lower than the response
rate to h,S survey was that our survey was consIderably longer
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Since the Business Week firms are all large, they may not
be representative of all firms in the economy. In addition, some
industries (e.g., construction and wholesale and retaIl trade) are
underrepresented in a sample oflarger firms and other industries
(e.g., manufacturing, public utilities, and finance) are overrepresented. This means that the composition of firms in the Business
Week 1000 will differ from the industrial composition of the
U. S. economy.
Thus, we also wanted to include some small and midsized
firms in our study. In addition to making the sample more representative of the U. S. economy, including smaller firms in the
study also allows us to investigate whether the reasons for wage
rigidity differ between firms of different sizes. We used several
sources to obtain small and midsized companies. One important
source was alumni of Colgate University 28 in professional and
managerial positions in the San Francisco, Miami, and Columbus
areas. These alumni were contacted by the authors, and the ones
willing to assist with our project put us in contact with the person
or department responsible for setting wages. Surveys were
mailed to the individuals who were willing to participate. Approximately 20 percent of our initial contacts resulted in a decision
not to participate by either the alumnus or the individual responsible for the firm's wage policy. Of the 72 surveys that were
mailed to individuals who agreed to partIcipate, 32 were returned, for a response rate of 44 percent.
The remaining firms for the non-Business Week sample were
obtained from several areas. The authors personally interviewed
or mailed surveys to individuals responsible for setting wages in
firms in the Des Moines, Manhattan, Long Island, central New
York, and Philadelphia areas. We obtained these firms from personal contacts, friends and relatives, and calls to some local firms.
Note that this method was similar to that used by Bewley [1994,
1995]. The response rate was over 75 percent for firms we
approached.
Note that the non-Business Week firms are not a random
sample of all small to midsized firms in the economy, since all the
respondents were located in certain geographical areas or had
some connection to the authors or to Colgate University. Because
of the sampling issues, the non-Business Week subs ample is
28. Campbell was a professor, and Kamlam was a student at Colgate UniverSIty at the tIme the survey was conducted
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probably less representative of small and mIdsized firms than the
Business Week subsample is of large firms However, the nonBusiness Week subsample was obtained from several dIfferent
sources, and It IS likely that biases in the responses would not be
significantly correlated between these different sources.
The Business Week firms were surveyed in the summer and
fall of 1994, and most of the non-Business Week firms were surveyed in the summer of 1993 and the fall of 1994. Overall, our
survey included 184 firms in 53 different two-digit SIC industries
and 34 dIfferent states.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGJo,

ITT

CORPORATION

REFERENCES
Agell, Jonas, and Per Lundborg, "Theones of Pay and Unemplo)ment Survey
EVldence from Swedlsh Manufacturing FIrms," Scandmaman JOIl! nal of EconomiCS, XCVII (1995), 295-307
Akerlof, George A , "Labor Contracts as Partlal Glft Exchange," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, XCVII (1982), 543-69
~-, "Gift Exchange and Efficlency-Wage Theory Four Views," Amencan Economic ReVIew, LXXIV (1984), 79--83
Akerlof George A, and Janet L Yellen, "The Falr Wage-Effort Hypothesls and
Unemployment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CV (1990),255-83
Azanadls, Costas, "Imphclt Contracts and Underemployment Eqmhbna," Journal of Politl('(fl Economy, LXXXIII (1975),1183--1202
Azanadls, Costas, and Joseph E Shght7, "lmphclt Contracts and Flxed Pnce
Eqmhbna," Quartelly Journal of Economics, XCVIII (1983),1-22
Bally, Martlll Nell, "Wages and Employment under Uncertam Demand," Revlew
of Economlc Studles, XLI (1974), 37--50
Bewley, Truman F , "A Fleld Study on Downward Wage Rlgidlty," paper presented
at the NBER workshop on BehaViOral Macroeconomlcs, 1991
~-, "Depressed Labor Markets as Explallled by Partlcipants," American Economic Revlew, LXXXV (1995), 250-54
Blmder, Alan S , "Why Are Prices StIcky? Prehmlllary Results from an Intervlew
Study," Amencan Economic ReVieW, LXXXI (1991), 89-96
Bhnder, Alan S" and Don H ChOl, "A Shred of EVldence on Theones of Wage
Shcluness," Quarterly ,Journal of Economlcs, CV (1990), 1003-15
Campbell, Carl M , "Do Flnns Pay EffiCIency Wages? EVIdence WIth Data at the
Flrm Level," Journal of Labor Ewnomlcs, XI (1993), 442-70
~-, "A Cross-Industry TIme-Senes Analysls of Qmts," Quarterly ReView of Economzcs and Fmance, XXXV (1995a), 53-72
- - , "The Relatwe Impacts of the Level and Change m Wages on Qmts," Iniernatwnal .Journal of Manpower, XVI (1995b), 31-41
Card, Davld, and Dean Hyslop, "Does InflatIOn 'Grease the "'-'beels of the LabOl
Market'?' NBER Workmg Paper No 5538, Apnl 1996
Carruth, AlanA, and Andrew J Oswald, Pay Detenwnrxtwn and Industlw[ Prospeltty (OxfUld Oxford Ulllverslty Press, 1989)
FIscher, Stanley, "Long-Term Contracts, RatIonal ExpectatIOns, and the Optlmal
Money Supply Rule," Journal nf PolitIcal Economy, LXXXV (1977) 191-206
Frank, Robert H, "Are Workers Pmd thelr MargInal Products?" Amerzcan E(onomlC Revzew, LXXIV (1984), 549-71
Glbbons, Robmt, and Lawrence F Katz, "Layoffs and Lemons," JOllrnal of Labo/'
EconO/1Ucs, IX (1991), 351-80

Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

THE REASONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY

789

Gordon, Donald F., "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic InqUIry, XII (1974), 431-59
Hart, OlIver D , "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetnc InformatIOn: An
IntroductIOn," Review of Economic StudieS, L (1983), 3-35.
HashImoto, Masanon, and Ben T Yu, "SpecIfic CapItal. Employment Contracts,
and Wage RIgidIty," Bell Journal of Economics, XI (1980), 536-49
Kahn, Shulamit. "EVIdence of Nominal Wage Stickiness from Microdata," Amencan EconomIC ReVieW, forthcoming
Kahneman, Damel, Jack L Knetsch, and RIchard Thaler, "FaIrness as a Constramt on Profit Seekmg' Entitlements m the Market," Amencan Economic
ReVieW, LXXVI (1986), 728-41.
Kaufman, Roger T , "On Wage StICkmess m Bntam's CompetJtlVe Sector," Bntlsh
Journal of Indu5trwl RelatIOns, XXII (1984),101-12
Knetsch, Jack L., "AssumptIons, BehaVIOral Fmdmgs, and PolIcy AnalYSIS," Journal of PolICY AnalYSIS and Management, XIV (1995), 68-78.
Lebow, DaVId E , DaVId J Stockton, and WIlham L Wascher, "Inflation, Nommal
Wage RIgidity, and the EffiCiency of Labor Markets," Federal Reserve Board
of Governors, Fmance and EconOllllcs DIscussion Senes, 94-45, October
1995
LeVIne, DaVId I , "Fairness, Markets, and Abihty to Pay Evidence from CompensatJOn Executives," Amencan Economic RevLCw, LXXXIII (1993),1241-59
Lmdbeck, AssaI', and Denms J. Snower, The InSider-OutsIder Theory of Employment and Unemployment (Cambndge, MA: MIT Press, 1988)
Martm, .Joanne, "Relative Depl'lVatIOn A Theory of DistnbutIve InjustIce for an
Era of Shnnkmg Resources," m Larry L Commmgs and Barry M Staw, eds ,
Re~earch In OrganizatIOnal BehaVIOr. An Annual Se1'le5 of Analytical Essays
and Cntlcal ReView, volume 3 (GreenwIch, CT JAI Press, 1981)
McLaughlm, Kenneth J., "RIgid Wages?" Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXIV
(1994), 383-414.
Salop, Steven C , "A Model ofthe Natural Rate of Unemployment," Amencan EconomiC ReView, LXIX (1979), 117-25
Schhcht, Ekkehart, "Labor Turnover, Wage Structure and Natural Unemployment," Zeltschnft fur die Gesamte Staatswlssewnschaft, CXXXIV (1978),
337-46
ShapIro, Carl, and Joseph E StIglItz, "EqmlIbnum Unemployment as a Worker
Dlscipline DeVIce," Amertcan Economic RevlCw, LXXIV (1984),433-44.
Solow, Robert M , "Another POSSIble Source of Wage Shckmess " Journal of MacroeconomiCS, I (1979), 79-82
Shghlz, Joseph E , "Alternative Theones of Wage DetermmatIon and Unemployment m L DC's: The Labor Turnover Model," Quarterly Journal of EconomICS, LXXXVIII (1974), 194-227
- - , "Theones of Wage RIgidity," 1Il James L ButkieWICZ, Kenneth ,J Koford,
and Jeffrey B MIller, eds ,Keynes' Economlc Legacy Contemporary Econorttlc
Theol'les (New York Praeger PublIshers, 1986).
Taylor, John B , "Staggered Wage Settlllg m a Macro Model," Amencan EconOlmc
ReVlcw, LXIX (1979),108-18
U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor StatlstIcs, Compensatwn and Workmg Condttwns (Washlllgton, DC: GPO, 1994).
WeISS, Andrew, "Job Queues and Layoffs 1Il Labor Markets WIth FleXIble Wages,"
Journal of Polltlcal Economy, LXXXVIII (1980), 526---38.
- - , EfficU'ncy Wages Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage DlsperslOn
(Pnnceton, NJ' Prmceton Umverslty Press, 1990)
Yellen, ,Janet L , "Efficiency Wage Models ofUnemploynwnt," American Economic
ReVieW, LXXIV (1984),200-05

Co

ri hI © 2001. All Ri hIs Reserved.

